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LIMITING LENDER LIABILITY UNDER

CERCLA BY ADMINISTRATIVE RULE
BY FRONA M. POWELL*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The question of whether banks or other lending institutions holding a
security interest in contaminated property should be liable for the costs of
cleaning up a site under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 19801 (CERCLA or Superfund) has
evolved into one of the toughest policy battles in the history of the Act.2
Recent court decisions holding lenders liable as "owners or operators" of
contaminated property under CERCLA have created uncertainty in the
lending community about what activities may expose them to liability.3
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Indiana University School of Business; B.A. 1970,
J.D. 1976, Indiana University. The author wishes to thank the Center for Real Estate Studies,
School of Business, Indiana University for its support of this article.
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75
(1988)).
2. See, eg., Marianne LaVelle, A Question of Waste Liability, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 3, 1990, at 3
(calling the issue a "clash between two of the toughest and most costly domestic problems of the
1990s").
3. Recent articles discussing those decisions and addressing the legal issues involved include
the following: Joel R. Burcat & Linda J. Shorey, Lender Liability UnderPennsylvania EnvironmentalLaw, 28 DuQ. L. REV. 413 (1990); Michele Corash & Lawrence Behrendt, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: Searchfor a Safe Harbor,43 Sw. L.J. 863 (1990); Paul A. Dominick & Leon
C. Harmon, Lender Limbo: The Perilsof Environmental Lender Liability, 41 S.C. L. REV. 855
(1990); Steven A. Kunzman, EnvironmentalIssues and ConcernsforLenders, 15 VT. L. REv. 532
(1991); Michael B. Kupin, New Alterations of the Lender Liability Landscape: CERCLA After the
Fleet Factors Decision, 19 REAL EsT. L. J. 191 (1991); Roslyn Tom, Interpretingthe Meaning of
Lender Management Participation Under Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L. J. 925
(1989); Timothy R. Zinnecker, Lender Liability Under CERCLA and the FleetingProtection of the
Secured CreditorExemption, 44 Sw. L. J. 1449 (1991); George E. Anhang, Note, Cleaning up the
Lender Management ParticipationStandard Under CERCLA in the Aftermath ofFleet Factors,15
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 235 (1991); Steven B. Bass, Comment, The Impact of the 1986Superfund

Amendments and ReauthorizationAct on the CommercialLending Industry: A CriticalAssessment,
41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 879 (1987); Michael A. Bett, Note, The Effect of Superfund Liability on
Property "Owners", 92 W. VA. L. REV. 125 (1989); Note, Cleaning up the Debris After Fleet
Factors:Lender Liability and CERCLA Is Security Interest Exemption, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1249
(1991); Lawrence S. Coven, Comment, Liability Under CERCLA: After a Decade of Delegation,
the Time is Ripe for Legislative Reform, 17 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 165 (1990); David G. Ditto &
Donald M. Gerstein, Comment, Superfund-Your Friendly Hometown Lender? The Liability of
FinancialInstitutions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 493 (1989); G. Alan Perkins, Comment, Lender Liability
UnderCERCLA Deserves More than a FleetingGlance, 13 U. ARK. LITTLE RoCK L.J. 209 (1991);
Paula T. Perkins, Comment, Abandonment in the Face of Possible Toxic Contamination: What's a
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As a result, banks and other lending institutions are increasingly reluctant to make loans in areas of possible hazardous waste contamination.4
Some fear that potential liability for environmental clean-up costs far exceeding the amount of the original loan will cause banks to stop making
loans to businesses in areas where there is any suspicion of hazardous waste
contamination. This not only prevents financing of environmental cleanups, it also creates a credit crunch that is particularly devastating for small
banks that finance small businesses.5 Lenders argue that rendering small
banks insolvent by imposing environmental clean-up costs upon them
means that the taxpayer has to absorb the cost because many lending institutions subject to CERCLA liability are federally insured.' Consequently,
imposing liability on lenders for environmental clean-up of contaminated
property may undermine the stability of the financial industry in general,
especially in light of the $500 billion savings and loan crisis.7
Lender to Do? 44 Sw. L. J. 1563 (1991); Sean P. Madden, Note, Will the CERCLA Be Unbroken? Repairingthe Damage After Fleet Factors, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 135 (1990); Michael F.
Smith, Comment, Limiting Liability of the Passive Lender Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 26 TULSA L.J. 75 (1990); Laurie J. Hammers & T. Patton Youngblood, Comment, The Battle Continues: Lenders are Still Searchingfor
Well-Defined Methods to Avoid Hazardous Waste Cleanup Liability, 19 STETSON L. REV. 633
(1990).
4. Barbara Toman, Environmental Worries Slow Loansto Small Businesses,WALL ST. J., Oct.
4, 1990, at B2; 136 CONG. REC. E1023 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1990) (extensions of remarks by Rep.
John J. LaFalce).

5. Id. Companies using hazardous materials in their processes such as dry cleaners, electric
platers, metal finishers, and wood product manufacturers may have trouble using their property as
collateral for this reason. Toman, supra note 4.
6. See Should Government Agencies and PrivateLending Institutions be Forced to Pay Enormous Sums to Clean up Environmental Contamination That They Did Not Cause? Hearings
Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U. S. Senate, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(June 12, 1991) (testimony by Edward W. Kelley, Jr., Board of Governors, Federal Reserve,
Washington, D.C.). Mr. Kelley stated that:
Lender liability presents a threat to the ability of these organizations to carry out the missions assigned to them by Congress. The Federal Reserve Banks fulfill important functions
in providing adjustment credit and acting as a lender of last resort for depository institutions. In acting as lender of last resort, a Federal Reserve Bank may advance funds to a
depository institution collateralized by the institution's loans, which may in turn be secured by real property. Should the institution fail, the FDIC, as receiver, would likely
acquire the loans from the Reserve Bank and would be left holding the loans.
Id.
7. LaVelle, supra note 2, at 3. The Resolution Trust Corporation which is responsible for
liquidating the assets of failed savings and loan associations and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation have supported increasing their protection under CERCLA. The FDIC has identified approximately 238 assets held by the agency for liquidation with a total book value of approximately $338 million as having potentially serious hazardous waste problems. EPA Opposes Push
to Amend CERCLA to BolsterProtectionfor Lenders, Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1488 (Apr.
24, 1991).
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The battle is shaping up as lenders and government agencies8 actively
lobby Congress for an amendment to CERCLA that would protect lenders
from liability under the Act in the event they foreclose on contaminated
property or act to protect their security interest in contaminated property. 9
Fearing liability for clean-up costs on properties they hold for liquidation,
government entities like the Resolution Trust Corporation, which is responsible for liquidating the assets of failed savings and loan associations, and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have gone on record as supporting changes in the law. 10
Environmental groups strongly oppose such legislative changes and argue that imposing liability upon lenders under Superfund is appropriate because the lender can protect its interest by exercising due diligence, and
because CERCLA liability under such circumstances creates incentives for
lenders to discover and ultimately prevent toxic contamination.1 1 Opponents of change fear that amending the Act to protect lenders will create a
legal loophole in the law that will ultimately permit polluters to escape liability while dumping their responsibility on taxpayers.12 These opponents
maintain that the law should encourage rather than discourage the banking
industry to investigate and make a good faith effort to carefully assess environmental risks.13 Environmental groups also claim that lenders have overstated the actual risk of their potential liability under the law.14
While the debate surrounding legislative proposals to limit lender liability by amending CERCLA continues, in June, 1991, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) proposed a regulation clarifying the scope of the
"security interest" exemption in CERCLA as it applies to financial institu8. Increased lender liability under CERCLA not only affects lenders, but also affects other
sectors of the economy such as businesses, farmers, and homeowners. Resolution Trust Corp.,

FDICSeek Limits To Superfund Liability in CERCLA Amendment, Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 9,
at 324 (Aug. 1, 1990).
9. See infra notes 164-74.
10. EPA Opposes Push to Amend CERCLA to Bolster Protectionfor Lenders,supra note 7, at
1488.
11. Testimony of Andrew Buschbaum, Esq., for the U.S. Public Interest Research Group
before the Subcommittee on Superfund, Ocean and Water Protection, April 11, 1991.
12. Id.
13. Id.; see also Amy D. Marcus & Amy Stevens, Banks' Burden in Cleanups is Questioned,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1991, at B5.
14. In testimony before the Senate Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on
Superfund, Ocean, and Water Protection, Raymond Ludwiszewski, acting assistant administrator
for enforcement at the EPA, said the EPA has never named FDIC or RTC as potentially responsible parties at any Superfund site and only eight of 18,392 formal notices of potential liability
under the Superfund law have gone to private lenders. EPA Opposes Push to Amend CERCLA to
Bolster Protectionfor Lenders, supra note 7, at 1488; see also supra note 13.
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tions and other persons holding a security interest in Superfund property. 15
Noting that recent court cases have raised questions within the lending
community about which actions by a security holder would be considered
"participating in a facility's management," thus voiding the exemption, the
proposed rule defines the meaning of this and other elements in statutes
pertaining to the liability of privately owned financial institutions and governmental receivers, conservators, loan guarantors, and other lending or
governmental entities holding indicia of ownership as a security interest in
16
contaminated facilities.
This article examines the issue of lender liability under CERCLA and
will focus on judicial interpretation of the security interest exemption in
section 101(20)A of CERCLA and will explore the questions whether administrative rule-making is an appropriate means to achieve clarification
of
statutory language utilized in that section. Section II examines the current
status of lender liability under CERCLA by reviewing the relevant statutory provisions and judicial decisions interpreting those provisions. Section
III addresses the recent rule proposed by the EPA to clarify the language of
the Act, and considers general legislative proposals to amend the Act. Section IV analyzes administrative rule-making by the EPA as opposed to a
legislative or judicial interpretation of the Act as a means of limiting lender
liability under CERCLA. Section V concludes that the fundamental policy
decisions underlying CERCLA are at issue in this debate, and that a legislative rather than an administrative response to the question of lender liability
under CERCLA is most desirable.
II.

ANALYSIS OF LENDER LIABILITY UNDER CURRENT STATUTORY
AND CASE LAW

A.

Lender Liability Under CERCLA-The Statutory Scheme

Numerous federal and state statutes address various aspects of hazardous waste liability. However, there is no uniform statutory scheme addressing the problem of toxic pollution. 7 The most important legislation
15. EPA National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Liability under CERCLA, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300(L). Since this
article was written the EPA has come out with the new regulations. EPA National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg.
18,344 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300).
16. Id In addition, the rule defines the meaning of certain statutory elements in CERCLA
that pertain to the liability of governmental entities that involuntarily acquire ownership or possession of contaminated facilities. Id.
17. Important federal statutes addressing the toxies problem include: the Federal Insecticide,

Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-179 (1988); the Clean Air Act, 33
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affecting the liability of lenders holding a security interest in real property
contaminated by toxic substances is the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), also known as
"Superfund." 18 By enacting CERCLA in 1980, Congress specifically intended to address the problem of leaking hazardous waste disposal sites. 19
The 1980 Act created a $1.6 billion fund to enable the government to cleanup contaminated sites throughout the nation.2" In 1986, Congress authorized an additional $8.5 billion to address the increasing number of potential
sites.2 1
To prompt clean-up of hazardous waste sites, CERCLA authorizes the
Environmental Protection Agency to order private parties to abate a condition that poses an "imminent and substantial endangerment" to public
health, to public welfare, or to the environment.2 2 In the alternative, CERCLA authorizes the EPA to undertake "removal" or "remedial" actions in
response to the release of hazardous substances at contaminated sites.23
The EPA may clean up a contaminated site using funds from the national
trust fund (or Superfund) 24 and may seek recovery for its costs from persons who are responsible for the hazardous substance releases at the site.
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988); the Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988); the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-71 (1988); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1988); and CERCLA, the so-called "Superfund" law,
42 U.S.C. § 9601-75 (1988).
18. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified in part as amended at 42 U.S.C. 960195 (1988)).
19. Id.
20. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (Supp. IV
1986)).
21. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 96-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
CERCLA establishes an information-gathering and analysis system for identifying and developing priorities for response actions at hazardous waste sites and directs the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency to issue regulations designating substances which may present
"substantial danger" to the public health or welfare if released into the environment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(14) (1988).
22. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). Private parties who voluntarily clean up a contaminated site may also sue other responsible parties for contribution under the Act. See, e.g.,
3550 Stevens Creek Ass'n. v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct.
2014 (1991); Bulk Distribution Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsante Toxic Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (S.D.
Fla. 1984).
23. Section 9604 authorizes the President to provide for such actions consistent with the
National Contingency Plan referred to in section 9605 of the Act. Removal actions are emergency
responses while remedial actions are designed to provide a long-term solution. Response actions
may be carried out by the federal government or through cooperative agreement with the states.
42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
24. The Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund is available for this purpose. 26 U.S.C.
§ 9507 (1988).
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Section 107(a) of CERCLA designates four classes of persons (called "potentially responsible parties" or PRPs) who may be liable for such response
costs:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility;
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or
possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility
or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity
and containing such hazardous substances; and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels
or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of
a hazardous substance, shall be liable .... z2
Liability under section 107(a) is "joint and several," and any PRP under
this section may be held strictly liable for the entire cost of clean-up. 6
The question of "owner" or "operator" liability under CERCLA centers upon the meaning of the terms as used in the Act.2 7 The statutory
definition of the terms gives little guidance to courts interpreting the language of this section, and courts have broadly construed the definition of
"owner" or "operator" in order to effectuate the remedial goals of the
Act.28 In some cases, courts have defined the terms "owner" or "operator"
to include lenders who havb loaned money for the purchase of contaminated property or acquired the property through foreclosure.29

25. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
26. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Wade,
577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D.
Pa. 1988). However, a party may avoid joint and several liability if it can establish a reasonable
basis for apportioning damages. In the 1986 amendment to CERCLA, called the Superfund

Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613
(1986), Congress accepted that CERCLA establishes strict liability that is joint and several. See
generally Madden, supra note 3, at 138.
27. See, eg., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).

28. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. 1985). The
definition of "owner" or "operator" in the Act is circular. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988) states,
in part: "The term 'owner or operator' means ... in the case of an inshore facility or an offshore
facility, any person owning or operating such facility ..
"
29. See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991) (discussed infra at notes 83-121).
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Much of the controversy surrounding the question of lender liability
under CERCLA has focused on the meaning of the "secured creditor" (or
"security interest") exemption set out in section 101(20)(A) of the Act.
This section expressly excludes from the term "owner or operator" "a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility,
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the
vessel or facility." 30 Judicial decisions interpreting key statutory language
in this section have not been uniform, and courts have not established clear
standards for predicting liability under the section.3 ' With liability for
clean-up costs often exceeding the loan by hundreds of thousands of dollars,
many fear that the uncertainty in the law will deter lenders from lending
money to businesses where there is any suspicion of hazardous waste contamination.3 2 These concerns have prompted the EPA to address the issue
of lender liability through administrative rule-making, and have prompted
33
Congress to consider amending the law to further clarify the exemption.
The debate centers upon the extent to which a lender can be involved in
overseeing a site's operation without losing the security interest exemption
and becoming potentially liable under CERCLA.3 4 There is no language in
the Act which elaborates on the meaning of "participating in the management" and there is little legislative history.3 5 Another issue of particular
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
31. See, eg., United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986);
Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,992.
32. Tom, supra note 3, at 927; see also 136 CONG. R1c. E1023, supra note 4.
While a lender may attempt to decrease its exposure to CERCLA liability by avoiding any
appearance of involvement in the activities surrounding management of the site (so that it cannot
be said to be "participating in the management of the site" for purposes of this section), the lack of
inquiry into potential environmental liabilities of real property offered as security at the time of
making the loan may deprive the lender of an innocent landowner defense under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b) of the Act. This section provides that an owner of contaminated property has a defense
to liability under CERCLA if it can demonstrate that, prior to acquiring the property, it took
affirmative steps to determine whether there were any environmental problems on the property.
The Act states that the buyer "must have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate
inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or
customary practice in an effort to minimize liability." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1988). It would
appear that the policies underlying this section and the "security interest" exemption may conflict-or at the least that a lender may be "whip-sawed" between the obligation to exercise due
diligence and yet avoid actively participating in the management of the facility, even in order to
minimize contamination at the site. For a general discussion of the due diligence requirement as it
applies to lenders, see Kunzman, supra note 3, at 543-44.
33. See infra notes 131-33.
34. The proposed rule and amendments also clarify the effect of foreclosure on a lender's
security interest upon it's liability as owner of the property under the Act. See infra notes 150-55.
35. Congress did not actually pass CERCLA until the close of the Ninety-Sixth Congress
when the Act was hurriedly enacted. The ambiguity of the Act and lack of legislative history
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concern to lenders is whether foreclosure of the security interest will expose
them to liability as owners within the chain of title. Conflicting decisions
on whether foreclosure constitutes taking ownership under section 9607(a)
have left lenders increasingly unsettled about the legal effects of taking such
action.36
B. JudicialInterpretationof the Security Interest Exemption Under
Section 101(20)(A):
1. United States v. Mirabile
The first case addressing the scope of the "secured creditor" exemption
under section 9607(b)(3) was United States v. Mirabile.3 7 In that case, a
federal district court first interpreted the secured creditor exemption in
CERCLA to mean that secured creditors, including one creditor who had
foreclosed on the site, could only be liable for response costs at a hazardous
waste site if the creditors exercised control over the "day-to-day" operation
of the site.3 8 The court found that the participation in management, which
is critical for purposes of the exemption, is "participation in the operational,
production, or waste disposal activities." Mere financial ability to control
waste disposal practices of the sort possessed by the secured creditors in the
case was an insufficient basis for the imposition of liability.3 9
The contaminated site at issue in Mirabile was the "Turco" site which
was located in Phoenixville, Pennsylvania. The United States brought a
civil action to recover costs of removing hazardous waste from the property
against, among others, the present owners of the site, Anna and Thomas
Mirabile. 4 American Bank and Trust Company (ABT), the Mellon Bank,
and the Small Business Association (SBA) were each involved in financing
the operations of Turco Coatings, Inc. which operated a paint manufacturing business at the site when the hazardous contamination occurred." After Turco filed a petition in bankruptcy and ceased operations at the site,
ABT foreclosed on the site and was the highest bidder at the sheriff's sale in
"planted the seeds for today's inconsistent judicial interpretations" of the Act. See Madden, supra
note 3, at 138.
36. Burneko, Lender Liability: CERCLA Seeks Out Banks' Deep Pockets, A.B.A. BANKER'S

WKLY., May 8, 1990 at 8, col. 1.
37. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 20,992, 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).

38. Id.
39. Id. at 20,995.
40. Id. at 20,994.
41. Id.
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August, 1981. In December, ABT assigned its bid to the Mirabiles, who
accepted a sheriff's deed to the property.42
The Mirabiles joined ABT and Mellon Bank as third-party defendants
in the action brought against them by the United States. ABT and Mellon
filed a counterclaim against the SBA, alleging that it was involved in creating the conditions at the site. Mellon, ABT, and the SBA then filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that a secured creditor's exercise of
financial control over a debtor should not bring the creditor within the
scope of CERCLA liability.43
The court first examined the statutory definition of "owner or operator"
under the Act and focused on the language exempting a "person, who, without participatingin the management of a vessel or facility holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility."'
The court interpreted this language as plainly suggesting that a
creditor may not be liable for clean-up costs under the Act if the creditor
does not become "overly entangled in the affairs of the actual owner or
operator of a facility."4 5 While active participation in the day-to-day corporate affairs could result in liability, the court noted that the real difficulty is
determining the actual point at which participation in the affairs of the corporation by the creditors becomes "participating in the management" of the
facility.4 6 The court believed that a distinction between a creditor's participation in the financial operations, as opposed to operational production, or
waste disposal activities of the corporation was critical in making this
determination. 47

42. Id In the period between the sheriff's sale and the assignment of the bid, ABT secured
the building against vandalism by boarding up windows and changing locks, made inquiries as to
the approximate cost of disposal of various drums located on the property, and, through its loan
officer, visited the property on various occasions to show it to prospective purchasers. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id (emphasis supplied). The court noted: "Were it not for the underscored exemption
from liability, the definition would be a hopeless tautology." Id.
45. Id.
46. The court cited prior cases involving the question of whether an individual involved in the
management of a corporate disposer/defendant may interpose the corporate shield to protect himself from personal liability as providing limited guidance in this case. New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Caralwan, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,699, 20,700 (D.S.C. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 848 (1987).
47. The Mirabile court supported this distinction by noting that the exemption from liability
is afforded to secured creditors who do not participate in the management of afacility. Mirabile,
15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,994 (emphasis supplied). "Facility" is defined in 42
U.S.C. § 9601(9) as:
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The court believed that ABT's involvement with the site presented the
most compelling case for granting its summary judgment motion because its
actions with respect to the foreclosure were plainly undertaken in an effort
to protect its security interest in the property and did not constitute participation in the day-to-day operations of the plant." According to the court,
ABT merely foreclosed on the property after all operations had ceased and,
thereafter, took prudent and routine steps to secure the property against
further depreciation. 9 The court also granted the SBA's motion for summary judgment because it never actually participated in the management of
Turco.5 ° However, the court denied Mellon Bank's motion because its motion presented a "cloudier situation."'" The court found that there was a
genuine issue of fact as to whether Mellon Bank, through its predecessor,
Girard Bank, engaged in the sort of participation in management that
would bring it within the scope of CERCLA liability.
Mirabile is an important case not only because it is the first case in
which a court interpreted the secured creditor exemption in CERCLA, 2
but also because it suggested for the first time that a distinction between
operational and financial involvement by the creditor is critical in determining whether the creditor "participated in the management" of the facility
for purposes of the secured creditor's exemption. The Mirabile court did
not consider the fact that one lender, ABT, had foreclosed on the property
and obtained equitable title to the property to be a critical factor in deter(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe

into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pod, lagoon, impoundment,
ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or
area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or
otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use
or any vessel.
Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,995. The court believed that reference to management of the "facility," as opposed to management of the affairs of the actual owner, suggests
that mere financial ability to control waste disposal practices is not sufficient for imposing liability.
Id. at 20,995.
48. Id. ABT argued that its successful bid at the sheriff's sale gave it only equitable title to
the property which never evolved into legal title by virtue of its subsequent assignment of that bid
to the Mirabiles. The court said it need not resolve the issue of whether, under Pennsylvania law,
ABT's successful bid "technically vested ABT with ownership as defined by the statute. Regardless of the nature of the title received by ABT, its actions with respect to the foreclosure were
plainly undertaken in an effort to protect its security interest in the property." Id.
49. Id. at 20,996.
50. Id. at 20,997.
51. Id.
52. There is an earlier bankruptcy case discussing this issue. In In re T. P. Long Chem., Inc.,
45 B.R. 278, 288 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985), the bankruptcy court stated, in dictum, that even if a
creditor had repossessed its collateral pursuant to its security agreement, it would not be an owner
or operator under CERCLA.
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mining whether that lender was entitled to assert the secured creditor exemption. 3 The court concluded that "mere financial ability to control
waste disposal practices was insufficient for the imposition of liability."5 4
2.

United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Company

In 1986, a United States district court in Maryland issued an opinion
that increased the anxiety of a lending community already concerned that
CERCLA presented a new and substantial risk to those institutions.55 In
United States v. MarylandBank & Trust Co.,56 the Maryland Bank & Trust
Company (MB&T) had formerly held a mortgage on a parcel of land contaminated with hazardous wastes.5 7 When the owners defaulted on the
loan, MB&T purchased the property in 1981 at the foreclosure sale with a
bid of $381,500, and continued to have record title to the property at the
time the EPA brought a clean-up action in 1983. When the EPA demanded payment of the clean-up costs of $551,713.50 from MB&T, and the
bank failed to respond, the Agency brought an action to compel payment.58
The question before the court on the parties' motion for summary judgment was whether MB&T was an "owner and operator" of the site within
the meaning of sections 9607(a)(1) and 9601(20)(A).59 In making its
53. The Mirabile court does not address the language in the secured creditor's exemption that
states the exemption only applies to a person who "holds indicia of ownershipprimarily to protect
his security interest in the vessel or facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988) (emphasis supplied).
Neither the SBA nor Mellon Bank in the case had foreclosed on its security interest in the site.
Unless the court believed that holding a security interest without foreclosing on that interest could
constitute an "indicia of ownership," the opinion suggests that the court may have interpreted the
language "participating in the management" of a facility as essentially equivalent to being an
"operator" for purposes of CERCLA liability. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at
20,992.
54. Id. at 20,995.
55. Lending institutions rarely considered environmental risks in evaluating loan applications, but this changed following the 1985 Mirabile decision. Corash & Behrendt, supra note 3, at
863-64.
56. 632 F.Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
57. The property, a 117 acre farm located near the town of California, Maryland, was owned
by the McLeods, who operated a trash and garbage business on the site. During 1972 or 1973, the
McLeods permitted dumping of hazardous wastes, including organics and heavy metals, on the
site. Id. at 575.
58. Id. at 575-76.
59. Id. at 576. In addition, MB&T raised an affirmative defense under § 107(b)(3), the socalled "third-party defense," which permits a party to avoid liability if it can prove that the release
of a hazardous substance was caused solely by:
an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or
than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly with the defendant,... if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
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determination, the court first examined the provision in section 9607(a) that
imposes liability upon "the owner and operator" of a facility.' Notwithstanding the conjunctive language "and" in the subsection, the court held
that a party did not have to be both an owner and operator to incur liability
under that subsection. 61 Because it was undisputed that MB&T had been
the owner of the facility since May, 1982, the court held that it could be
liable as an "owner" under the section.6 2
The court then turned to the question of whether the statutory exemption in section 9601(20)(A) (the "secured creditor" exemption) applied in
this case. MB&T argued that it qualified for the exemption because it acquired ownership of the site through foreclosure on its security interest in
the property. 63 The court, however, disagreed and stated that the exemption "covers only those persons who, at the time of the clean-up, hold indicia of ownership to protect a then-held security interest in the land."'
According to the court, MB&T only held indicia of ownership during the
life of the mortgage. 65 The court held that "[t]he exclusion does not apply
to former mortgagees currently holding title after purchasing the property
substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against
foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions....
IaM at 581. The United State's motion for summary judgment was denied since the court concluded that genuine issues of material fact remained. Id.
60. Id
61. Id at 577. The court made this determination based on the policy underlying CERCLA.
The court's examination of the legislative history, however sparse, convinced it to interpret the
language of the subsection broadly. Id at 578. The court credited the ambiguity in the statutory
language to be a result of a "hastily conceived compromise statute... since members of Congress
might well have had no time to dot all the i's or cross all the t's." Id.
62. The court agreed with the decision in New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032
(2d Cir. 1985), in which that court stated that "[s]ection 9607(a)(1) [107(a)(1)] unequivocally
imposes strict liability on the current owner of a facility from which there is a release or a threat of
release, without regard to causation." Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044 (cited with approval in
Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 578).
63. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579.
64. Id The court based this conclusion on the verb tense of the exclusionary language "holds
indicia of ownership." Id.
65. Id. Under the law of Maryland and twelve other states, the lender actually holds title to
the property while the mortgage is in force. Id For a discussion of the different legal theories
through which a lender holds a security interest in the property, see Note, Cleaning up the Debris
after Fleet Factors:Lender Liability and CERCLA s Security Interest Exemption, supra note 3, at
1258-63.
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at a foreclosure sale, at least when as here, the former mortgagee has held
title for nearly four years, and a full year before the EPA clean-up." 66
The Maryland Bank court based its decision not only on a statutory
interpretation of the language used in the exemption, but also upon legislative history and the policy of the Act. According to the court, if the bank
were to escape liability in such cases, the federal government would bear the
cost of cleaning up the site and the lender-owner would benefit from the
clean-up by the increased value of the rehabilitated property.6 7 The court
believed that lenders could protect themselves by investigating and discovering potential problems in their secured properties.68
The MarylandBank court attempted to reconcile its decision with the
holding in United States v. Mirabile.69 In Mirabile,according to the Maryland Bank court, the mortgagee's purchase of land at the foreclosure was
"plainly undertaken in an effort to protect its security interest in the property."7 Further, "that holding pertained to a situation in which the mortgagee-turned-owner properly assigned the property. ' 7 1 To the extent the
Mirabile decision conflicted with its decision in this case, the Maryland
Bank court "respectfully disagreed" with that decision.7 2
The decision in Maryland Bank significantly increased the potential liability of lenders who foreclosed on contaminated property. Moreover, the
Maryland Bank court's inability to completely reconcile its decision with
Mirabile contributed to the confusion underlying the interpretation of
lender liability under CERCLA. The lack of legislative history of CERCLA, the ambiguity inherent in the language used in sections 9607 and
9601 of the Act, and the conflicting judgments as to the policies underlying
the Act, combined to create an atmosphere of uncertainty in an already
worried financial community.73
66. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.Supp. at 579. The court fails to explain why the
timing of the EPA clean-up should be significant in determining whether a foreclosing lender
should be liable under this section.
67. "At the foreclosure sale, the mortgagee could acquire the property cheaply. All other
prospective purchasers would be faced with potential CERCLA liability, and would shy away
from the sale." I at 580.
68. Il
69. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. 1985). The decision is discussed supra
at notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
70. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,992.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. The MarylandBank decision may be limited to its facts because the court suggested that
a lender might assert the exemption if it "purchased the property at foreclosure sale and then
promptly resold it .. " Id. at 579 n.5. One writer has suggested that this dictum conflicts with
the logic of the decision, and the court did not indicate how long a lender could hold title before
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Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg.

In Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Mfg., 74 another federal district
court added to the fears of the lending community by holding that the secured creditor exemption did not apply for the period when a foreclosing
bank was the record owner of contaminated property.7 5 In Guidice, the
court divided the question of the lender's liability as a potentially responsible defendant into two time frames: (1) the period prior to the bank's foreclosure and purchase of the property and; (2) the period of the bank's
ownership. 76 As to the first period of time, the court adopted the Mirabile
test which exempted a mortgagee from CERCLA liability so long as the
mortgagee did not participate in the managerial and operational aspects of
the facility.77 As to the latter period of time, the court noted that Mirabile
and MarylandBank diverged on the question of whether the security interest exemption applied to a secured creditor who purchased its security interest at a foreclosure sale. 73 The Guidice court then adopted the rationale
of the court in Maryland Bank, interpreting that holding to mean that
whenever a mortgagee becomes an owner of the property, the security inter79
est exemption is lost.
The Guidice court based its ruling not only on the policy considerations
underlying the decision in MarylandBank, 0 but also on the failure of Con8
gress to amend the statute in 1986 to exclude such lenders from liability. '
According to one writer, Guidice fulfilled the "dire predictions" of commercial lenders who had become acutely aware of the expanding ambit of CER82
CLA liability.
reselling it without incurring liability. Note, Cleaning up the Debris after Fleet Factors, Lender
Liability and CERCLA's Security Interest Exemption, supra note 3, at 1255 n.47.
74. 732 F.Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
75. Id. at 563.

76.
77.
78.
applied
closure

Id.
Id.
The Guidice court interpreted Mirabile to mean that exemption from CERCLA liability
as long as a lender limited its activities to the financial aspects of management, and foreand repurchase (presumably under the particular facts of that case) were "natural conse-

quences in protection of a security interest." Id. at 563.

79. Ido
80. The Guidice court noted the MarylandBank court's concern that exemption of the bank

would permit the bank to enjoy a windfall by the increased value of the improved land. Id.
81. According to the court, the Act was amended to protect state and local governments that

acquired ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment,
or similar means. "That Congress did not simultaneously amend the statute to exclude from
lability lenders who acquire property through foreclosure might indicate that Congress intended
to hold them liable as owners." Id.
82. Bradley S. Tupi, Guidice v. BFG Electroplating: Expanded CERCLA Liabilityfor Fore-

closing Lenders, Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 844 (Dec. 20, 1989).
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United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.

In May, 1990, the questions regarding the secured creditor exemption
first reached a federal appellate court. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in
United States v. Fleet FactorsCorp. (Fleet),8" stunned the lending community and has become the focus of an intensified effort to change the law in
order to clarify the secured creditor exemption and to protect commercial
lenders.8 4
In Fleet, Fleet had entered into a "factoring" agreement with Swainsboro Print Works (SPW), a cloth printing facility.85 As collateral for
Fleet's agreement to advance funds, Fleet had obtained a security interest in
SPW's textile facility and its equipment, inventory, and fixtures.8 6 In August 1979, SPW filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, and the factoring
agreement continued with court approval. In February 1981, SPW ceased
operations and began to liquidate its inventory. In December 1981, SPW
was adjudicated bankrupt under Chapter 7.s 7
In May 1982, Fleet foreclosed its security interest in some of SPW's
inventory and equipment, and contracted with an industrial liquidator to
auction off the collateral. In August 1982, Fleet contracted with Nix Riggers to remove the unsold equipment from the premises.8 8 Subsequently,
on January 20, 1984, the EPA found toxic contamination at the site and
incurred clean-up costs of nearly $400,000.9 In July 1987, the facility was
conveyed to Emanuel County, Georgia, at a foreclosure sale to recover state
and county taxes.90
The government sued the principal officers and stockholders of SPW
and Fleet to recover its cost for cleaning up the site.9 1 Both the government
and Fleet filed a motion for summary judgment on the question of whether
Fleet could be liable for the EPA's response costs at the site. 92 The dis83. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
84. In response to the decision in Maryland Bank, Representative LaFalce of New York
introduced H.R. 2085, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990), which would permit commercial lending
institutions to foreclose on their security without subjecting themselves to CERCLA liability.
Tupi, supra note 79, at 847 n.35.
85. Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1552.
86. Id
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1553.
89. The EPA found 700 fifty-five gallon drums containing toxic chemicals and forty-four
truckloads of material containing asbestos at the site. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id
92. Id.
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trict court denied both motions and certified the issues for interlocutory
appeal.9 a
On appeal, the government argued that Fleet was liable either as a present owner and operator of the facility, or as the owner or operator of the
facility at the time the wastes were disposed. 94 The court first addressed the
question of whether Fleet could be liable as the present owner or operator
of the facility, and concluded that it could not. The court noted that at the
date litigation commenced, the owner of the facility was Emanuel County,
Georgia. The statute provided that in the event a state or local government
acquired the property due to foreclosure, its owner or operator is deemed to
be "any person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at
such facility immediately beforehand. ' 95 Because Fleet never foreclosed on
its security interest in the facility, it neither owned, operated, nor controlled
the site prior to the county's acquisition. Thus, Fleet was not liable under
this section.9 6
The court then turned to the question of whether Fleet could be liable
under CERCLA section 9607(a)(2), which imposes liability on "any person
who at the time of disposal.., owned or operated any.., facility at which
such hazardous substances were disposed .... ,97 To make that determination, the court discussed the scope of the security interest exemption.
The parties did not dispute the fact that Fleet held "indicia of ownership." Fleet held a deed of trust to the facility to protect its security interest
in the facility. 98 The critical issue was whether Fleet "participated in management" sufficiently to incur liability under the provision.
Fleet argued that the Mirabiledistinction should apply and that secured
creditors should be permitted to provide financial assistance without risking
CERCLA liability so long as they did not participate in the day-to-day
management of the business. This test was adopted by the district court
93. The district court rejected the government's claim that Fleet could be liable as a present
owner of the facility, but found a sufficient issue of fact as to whether Fleet was an owner or
operator of the facility at the time of wastes were disposed of at the site. Id. at 1554.
94. That is, either under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) or § 9706(a)(2). Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at
1554.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1988) provides that:
in the case of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, [its owner or operator is] any person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled
activities at such facility immediately beforehand.
Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1555.
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988)).
98. Id. at 1556.
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below.9 9 Although the appellate court agreed with the district court's resolution of the summary judgment motion, the court disagreed with the district court's construction of the statutory exemption. The appellate court
then adopted a new standard, holding that a secured creditor may incur
liability under section 9706(a)(2) without being an operator by "participating in the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes." l'0
The court expressly rejected the Mirabile test, stating that: "It is not
necessary for the secured creditor actually to involve itself in the day-to-day
operations of the facility in order to be liable ....
Nor is it necessary for
the secured creditor to participate in management decisions relating to hazardous waste."10 1 The court, however, indicated that a secured creditor
could monitor the debtor's business and become involved in "occasional
and discrete financial decisions relating to the protection of its security interest" without losing the exemption."12 The issue, according to the court,
was not whether the creditor's activity was taken to protect its security interest, but the nature and extent of the creditor's involvement with the
facility. 103
The court of appeals in Fleet based its decision on what it perceived to
be the "overwhelmingly remedial" goal of the CERCLA statutory scheme,
and the position that ambiguous statutory terms should be construed to
favor liability." °4 The court also said the district court's construction of the
exemption, that a secured creditor must be involved in the operations of a
facility in order to incur liability as "participating in the management,"
would essentially require a secured creditor to be an "operator" in order to

99. This test had been adopted by the lower court:
Applying this standard, the trial judge concluded that from the inception of Fleet's relationship with SPW in 1976 to June 22, 1982, when Baldwin entered the facility, Fleet's
activity did not rise to the level of participation in management sufficient to impose CERCLA lability. The court, however, determined that the facts alleged by the government
with respect to Fleet's involvement after Baldwin entered the facility was sufficient to preclude the granting of summary judgment in favor of Fleet on this issue.
Id. at 1557.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1557-58. The court stated: "We, therefore, specifically reject the formulation of
the secured creditor exemption suggested by the district court in Mirabile." Id. at 1558.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1560.
104. Id. at 1557 (citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313,
1317 (11th Cir. 1990); U. S. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.
Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986)).
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incur liability.° 5 This construction, according to the court, essentially rendered the exemption meaningless because such individuals would already be
liable as operators. "Had Congress intended to absolve secured creditors
from ownership liability, it would have done so."'" In addition, the court
determined that the terms "operator" 0 7and "participating in the management of a facility" are not congruent.1
The court also justified its decision on general public policy grounds.
Theoretically, the ruling would encourage potential creditors to investigate
the waste treatment systems and policies of potential debtors, and encourage creditors to monitor the hazardous waste treatment systems and
policies of their debtors. The court disputed those who might challenge the
ruling as creating disincentives for lenders to lend money to businesses with
potential hazardous waste problems, saying such concerns were unfounded.'OS Applying its new test to the facts of the case, the court agreed
with the district court and found that the government alleged sufficient
facts to hold Fleet liable under section 9607(a)(2).10 9
The reaction by lenders and many commentators to the decision in Fleet
was swift and negative. The decision was criticized for misconstruing the
statutory language of the exemption 0 and for creating a new standard of
liability for lenders-a standard that holds lenders to a higher standard
than non-lenders.' 1 ' According to critics, if Congress intended to enact the
exemption to protect lenders who, under some state laws, actually hold indicia of ownership for the limited purpose of protecting a security interest," 2 Fleet inverted the exception to create a new class of PRPs. As a
result, the court established a new, independent, and substantive basis for
CERCLA liability.'13
The decision in Fleet has also been criticized for misinterpreting the policy effects of the rule. Some read the opinion as "extend[ing] potential
Superfund liability not only to secured lenders who have participated in the
management of the facility, . . . but also to lenders who merely have the
105. Id.

106.
107.
108.
109.

Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557.
Id.
Id. at 1558.
Id. at 1559.

110. Several commentators have disputed the court's interpretation of the "indicia of owner-

ship" rule. See, e.g., Anhang, supra note 3; Note, Cleaning up the Debris After Fleet Factors:
Under Liability and CERCLA 'S Security Interest Exemption, supra note 3.

111. Id.
112. Id.

113. Madden, supra note 3, at 155.
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capacity to influence a facility's hazardous waste disposal practices."'1 14 As
a result, rather than encouraging participation by the lending community in
remediating environmental problems, the result may be the opposite. It is
suggested, that lenders will studiously avoid investigating and remedying
such hazardous waste problems in an attempt to avoid participating in the
kind of management upon which the court premised liability. 115
Many are troubled by the ambiguity of the Fleet test. Although prior
decisions appeared to permit creditors to offer general financial advice, protect the site, and assist the mortgagor in obtaining additional financing, the
court's ruling raised fears that even those limited activities could lead to
liability.116 The vagueness of the test is compounded by the element of conjecture. For example, the question: "Have I involved myself in management to the extent that I could influence hazardous waste decisions?" is
filled with uncertainty and the court does not suggest how an inference of
"capacity to influence" may be established.11 7
Not all view the decision in Fleet as a radical departure from earlier case
law. Fear that the decision established an overly broad standard of "management participation" may be unwarranted. The standard of liability
under the rule still requires evidence that the security holder actuallyparticipated in the financial management to a degree indicating its capacity to
influence the treatment of hazardous waste. 1 ' Mere capacity of a lender to
influence the debtor, without more, is insufficient for imposing liability
under the Fleet decision. 119
Perhaps the Fleet decision will affirm that a lender cannot be liable as an
owner or operator unless it actually becomes involved in the operations in
some way. 120 Some suggest that if this happens, the case will produce further litigation as courts address, on a case-by-case basis, the specific actions
114. Glenn Unterberger, LenderLiability UnderSuperfund: What the CongressMeant to Say
Was.... Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 541 (Sept. 19, 1990).
115. Zinnecker, supra note 3, at 1470.
116. See David J. Freeman, Recent Case Law May Expand Lenders' Risks UnderSuperfund,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 17, 1990, at 18 (noting that a "capacity to influence" test may well make all
secured creditors vulnerable on the grounds of some inherent power to affect their borrower's
behavior. If so, the exception would swallow the rule."). Id. at 19.
117. Madden, supra note 3, at 156.
118. John P.C. Fogarty, The Legal Case Against Lender Liability, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10,243 (May 1991).
119. The court said: "Under the standard we adopt today, a secured creditor may incur
section 9607(a)(2) liability, without being an operator, by participatingin the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of
hazardous wastes." Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557 (emphasis added); see generally Anhang,
supra note 3, at 245.
120. Fogarty, supra note 118, at 10,243.
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by lenders that may give rise to "actual participation" in the management
of a facility, which would trigger CERCLA liability.' 2 1
5.

In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.

The Ninth Circuit recently addressed the question of lender liability and
the scope of the secured creditor exemption in In re Bergsoe Metal Corp. 2' 2
The Ninth Circuit held that the Port of St. Helens, a municipal corporation
empowered to issue revenue bonds to promote industrial development, was
not liable as an owner or operator for environmental clean-up costs incurred at a lead recycling facility financed by the Port. The court agreed
that the Port owned the Bergsoe recycling plant because the deed to the
property was in the name of the Port.'2 3 The court, however, agreed with
the Port that it was not a CERCLA owner because it fell within the security
interest exception.' 2 4
According to the court, holding "paper title" to the plant alone did not
make the Port an owner of the facility.' 2 5 Under the security interest exception, the reason why the lender holds such "indicia of ownership" is the
relevant inquiry.' 26 Furthermore, the court added that it was clear from the
statute that whatever the precise parameters of "participation", there must
be some actual management before a secured creditor will fall outside the
exception. Because it found that the Port did not actually participate in the
management of the plant or exercise any control over Bergsoe once the financing arrangements were complete, the court held that the Port could not
27
be liable as an owner.1
The decision in Bergsoe should give solace to lenders who fear that Fleet
has expanded the scope of lender liability beyond the requirement of actual
participation in management. Citing Fleet as authority for its holding, the
Ninth Circuit held that a creditor must, as a threshold matter, exercise actual management authority before it can be liable for action or inaction
resulting in the discharge of hazardous wastes.' 2 8 Although the court was
unwilling to establish the parameters of "participation in management" as
used in the security interest exemption, it did suggest that some input by the
121. Madden, supra note 3, at 157.

122. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
123. Id. at 671.
124. In this case, according to the court, the Port's only involvement was to give its approval

to the project and to issue bonds that served as a financing vehicle. Id.
125. lId
126. Id. at 672.
127. Id. at 673.
128. Id. at 673 n.3.
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lender, at least at the planning stages of a project, did not amount to management. The court said:
Were this sufficient to remove a creditor from the security interest
exception, the exception would cease to have any meaning. Creditors do not give their money blindly, particularly the large sums of
money needed to build industrial facilities. Lenders normally extend
credit only after gathering a great deal of information about the proposed project, and only when they have some degree of confidence
that the project will be successful.1 29
III. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO CLARIFY THE
SECURED CREDITOR EXEMPTION UNDER CERCLA

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, courts have had difficulty in
developing a precise rule that would provide lenders any degree of certainty
about what activities they may undertake without incurring CERCLA liability. Concerns are that the EPA and the courts, in a search for deep pockets to pay for Superfund clean-ups, have expanded superfund liability far
beyond what Congress intended. 13 0 Such concerns have prompted some
members of Congress to introduce bills in the House and Senate to clarify
and, in some cases, expand the secured creditor exemption for lenders
131
under federal environmental law.
In response to the those concerns and pressure from government agencies, on June 5, 1991, the EPA announced a regulation clarifying the scope
of the exemption from clean-up liability for financial institutions and other
persons who hold security interests in property under the Superfund law.132
In order to "specif[y] when lenders cross the line from their typical 'credi129. d at 672. For the same reason, a lender who retains the right to inspect the premises,
to reenter, and to take possession upon foreclosure would not amount to actual participation in
management because nearly all secured creditors have such rights. Id
130. SBA Tells Senate Panel It Could be Hit Hard by Potential Liability Under CERCLA,
Banking Daily (BNA) A-21 (June 19, 1991).
131. In 1990, Rep. John J. LaFalce, a New York Democrat who represents the Love Canal
district and is chairperson of the Small Business Committee, introduced legislation (H.R. 4494),
backed by 229 cosponsors that would overturn recent court rulings; Republican Jack Garn of
Utah also introduced a similar bill (S.2319) in the Senate. In 1991, Rep. LaFalce introduced a
bill that refined his previous effort (H.R. 4494), to essentially codify the revised draft of the EPA
rule. Senator Garn's bill (S.651) would limit the liability of an insured depository institution
under any federal law to the actual benefit conferred on the institution by a response action. For a
recent analysis of these various bills, see Bradley S. Tupi & William R. Nicholson, Legislation to
Restore CERCLA's Security Interest Exemption-Which Bill Should Lenders Support?, Toxics L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 161 (July 3, 1991); see generally infra notes 164-74 and accompanying text.
132. EPA National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Liability under CERCLA, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798 (Jun. 24, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300
subpt. L).
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tor' status and become liable because they have participated in the management of the facility,"1 33 the proposed rule purports to clarify the meaning of
certain statutory elements in CERCLA that pertain to the liability of both
privately-owned financial institutions and governmental entities.
A.

The EPA ProposedRule Limiting Lender Liability Under CERCLA

1. Rule-Making in General
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), originally adopted in
1 35
1948,134 establishes the basic framework for administrative rule-making.
An administrative "rule" is defined by the APA as follows: "the whole or
part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or
describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an
agency.... ,,136
Most agency rule-making is "informal rule-making" under the APA.
Informal rule-making (or "notice and comment" rule-making) under the
APA requires the agency to publish a notice of the proposed rule in the
Federal Register, give interested persons an opportunity to comment, provide a concise general statement of the basis and purpose for the final rule,
and publish the final rule not less than 30 days before its effective date. 137
The EPA has published a notice of its proposed rule interpreting lender
liability under CERCLA and has provided an opportunity for comment as
required by the APA. 13 8 Because the EPA proposed the rule as an amendment to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan (NCP) under CERLCA, specific provisions of CERCLA will apply to
139
any judicial review of the regulation.
133. Statement of Raymond B. Ludwiszewski, Acting Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, (June 12, 1991).
134. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3344, 5372, 7521 (1988).
135. Although the APA continues to be central to rule-making, Congress has enacted a variety of specific regulatory statutes mandating rule-making procedures that supplement or supersede the APA's provisions, and judicial decisions have refined rule-making procedures. See A
GUIDE To FEDERAL AGENCY RULE-MAKING, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1991).

136. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988).

137. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988). "EPA's principal rule-making in the Superfund program-and
its clearest opportunity to set the course, pace, and tone for Superfund clean-ups-is the National
Contingency Plan." Joseph Freedman, ProposedAmendments to the National Contingency Plan:

Explanation and Analysis, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (BNA) 10,103 (March, 1989).
139. CERCLA provides that review of any regulation promulgated under the Act may only
be had upon application by any interested person in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United
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In announcing the proposed rule, the EPA recognized that the revision
of the NCP raised important issues. As a result, the EPA expressly reserved the right to revise the proposed rule following the comment period."4 Prior to the promulgation of a final rule, however, the EPA stated

its intention to utilize the rule as guidance for implementing sections
9601(20)(A) and 9601(35)(A)(ii) under the Act.14
Those concerned that the proposed rule goes too far to protect lenders
from liability for clean-up costs will almost certainly challenge the rule by
questioning the EPA's authority for issuing the rule. 42 The EPA's proposed rule on lender liability will be given weight by a reviewing court so

long as it is not "arbitrary" or "capricious." 143 The APA distinguishes
between "substantive rules" (legislative rules which have the force and effect of law), "interpretative rules" (rules which advise the public of the
agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it administers), and
"general statements of policy" (statements issued by an agency to advise the
public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise

a discretionary power).'" The distinctions not only affect procedural requirements for adoption of the rule,' 4 5 but they are also significant because
agencies need statutorily delegated authority to adopt a legislative rule.
States for the District of Columbia. Any such application must be made within ninety days from
the date of promulgation of such regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a) (1988). Despite this provision,
however, one court concluded that district courts have jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of regulations. SCA Services, Inc. v. Thomas, 634 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) added section 113(h)
to CERCLA, which essentially withdrew jurisdiction for review until the government seeks to
enforce an order or to recover a penalty, seeks reimbursement, seeks to compel a remedial action,
or when a citizen brings suit. See Alfred R. Light, When EPA Makes a Superfund Mistake Judicial Review Problems Under SARA, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,148 (May 1987).
140. Light, supra note 139. The agency also specifically seeks comment on regulatory language specifying other types of acquisitions by governmental entities that may be considered "involuntary" within the meaning of section 9601(35)(A)(ii) of the statute.
141. EPA National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution contingency Plan: Lender Liability under CERCLA, supra note 132, at 8.
142. One of the arguments supporting congressional action on the issue, rather than reliance
on the EPA rule, is the fear that courts may rule that the EPA proposal exceeds that agency's
authority. Banking Daily (BNA), at 21 (July 11, 1991); see also infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text (discussing the appropriate standard of judicial deference in this case).
143. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984). The APA provides that a reviewing court shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be... in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1988).
144. A GUIDE To FEDERAL AGENCY RULE-MAKING, supra note 135, at 54.

145. See, e.g., Fertilizer Inst. v. E.P.A., 935 F.2d 1303, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The court
stated that "as a general rule, an agency can declare its understanding of what a statute requires
without providing notice and comment, but an agency cannot go beyond the text of a statute and
exercise its delegated powers without first providing adequate notice and comment." Id. at 1308.
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However, an agency may issue interpretive rules without a delegation of
rule-making authority.146 The question, whether interpretive rules, which
do not have the "force of law," are entitled to the same degree of judicial
deference as legislative rules, has not been completely resolved. 47 However, some recent cases indicate that the distinction for purposes of the standard of deference to be applied by the courts upon judicial review is not
1 48
significant.

2.

Significant Issues Under Section 9601(20)(A) Addressed by EPA'S
Proposed Lender Liability Rule

The EPA's recent proposal attempts to clarify some of the questions
raised by recent court decisions interpreting the security interest exemption.
In order to clarify the exemption and provide some guidance for lenders,
the EPA lists a range of activities that a private or governmental lending
institution holding a security interest in a facility may undertake without
being considered a participant in the facility's management. The rule also
defines the meaning of certain statutory requirements pertaining to the liability of governmental entities that involuntarily acquire ownership of contaminated facilities. 149 This topic has been of great concern to many officials
in light of the recent savings and loan financial crisis.
146. A GUIDE To FEDERAL AGENCY RULE-MAKING, supra note 135, at 62-63. Authority to
issue interpretive rules may either be specifically delegated or derived from general rule-making
authority. Id.
147. Rules have been held to be legislative rules if they fill a statutory gap, create an exemption from a general standard of conduct, establish a new regulatory structure, or complete an
incomplete statutory design. Id. at 62. The proposed EPA rule appears to fall within this
definition.
148. Id at 63. "Some courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 647 U.S. 837 (1984), as giving interpretive rules the
same degree of deference as legislative rules. If a proposed rule or statement will have a substantial impact on the public, regardless of whether it is characterized as an "interpretive" or "legislative" rule, the Administrative Conference recommends the use of the "notice-and-comment"
procedure that the EPA followed in Chevron. Id. at 69.
149. Under CERCLA, a governmental lending entity, receiver, or conservator involuntarily
acquiring a contaminated facility may be entitled to assert the "innocent landowner defense"
under sections 9601(35)(A)(ii) and 9607(b)(3). The proposed rule provides protection for governmental entities, like the RTC and FDIC, by including in the definition of "involuntary transfer"
entities that acquire property under statutes requiring them to acquire such property, provided
other elements of the innocent landowner defense are met. See EPA National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Liability under CERCLA, supra note 132, at
28,809 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.1105).
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As proposed, 150 the EPA rule defines "indicia of ownership" as "evidence of interests in real or personal property held as security for a loan or
other obligation, including full title to real or personal property acquired
incident to foreclosure and its equivalents." 15' 1 The rule further defines the

holder of a security interest as including "any successor-in-interest, including a subsequent purchaser on the secondary market, loan guarantor or insurer... ."'15 The EPA rule rejects the court's analysis of the exemption in
United States v. MarylandBank and Trust Company" 3 and Guidice v. BEG
Electroplatingand Manufacturing Co. Inc.,15 4 (holding that the exclusion
does not apply to a mortgagee that purchases the property at a foreclosure
sale), and expressly permits a security holder to "foreclose, sell, liquidate,
wind-up operations, or retain and continue functioning the enterprise in
order to protect the value of the asset.., without incurring liability under
1 55
CERCLA section 107(a)(1)."

The rule also defines the phrase "participation in management" as "actual participation" in management, an interpretation consistent with the
Ninth Circuit's recent interpretation of that phrase in Bergsoe. 156 The rule

150. The proposed rule has gone through several revisions to date. Just before its June 5th
release, the EPA changed significantly to de-emphasize the duty of lenders to conduct environmental audits on the property. 12 Inside E.P.A., No. 24, at 3 (June 14, 1991).
151. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,808 (June 24, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.100(a)).
152. IdL
153. Id.
154. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986). The
Maryland Bank court held that the exclusion does not apply to former mortgagees "currently
holding title after purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale, at least when, as here, the former
mortgagee has held title for nearly four years, and a full year before the EPA clean-up." Id at
579. See supra notes 55-73 and accompanying text.
155. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Mfg. Co., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 556, 563 (W.D. Pa.
1989). The Guidice court held that "the security interest exemption of 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)
does not apply for the period the Bank was record owner of the Berlin property. During that
period, the Bank was a potentially responsible party as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)."
Guidice, 732 F.Supp. at 563. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
156. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,809 at § 300.1100(b)(1)(iii) includes the following definition of "indicia
of ownership":
Full legal title acquired through foreclosure, purchase at foreclosure sale, acquisition or
assignment of title in lieu of foreclosure, acquisition of a right to title, or other agreement
in settlement of the loan obligation, or any other formal or informal manner by which the
security holder temporarily acquires, for subsequent disposition, possession of the borrower's collateral, and are necessary incidents to protection of the security interest.
Section 300.1 100(b)(1)(ii) sets out circumstances under which the security holder may lose the
exemption for failing to take reasonable steps to dispose of the property following foreclosure.
The June 5th proposal abandoned a requirement in earlier drafts of the rule that the lender must
resell foreclosed property within 18 months in order to prove it is not holding the property as part
of its investment portfolio.
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addresses concerns raised by the court's decision in Fleet I 7 by specifically
excluding from the definition "the mere capacity, or ability to influence, or
the unexercised right to control facility operations."' 58 The rule then attempts to distinguish between permissible activities and those that would
constitute actual participation in management for purposes of the exemption, utilizing the "day-to-day" control test first articulated by the court in
United States v. Mirabile.I59 Although the rule specifically permits a lender
to undertake an environmental inspection of the property at the inception of
the loan, it does not require an inspection in order for the lender to qualify
for the exemption."6 The rule contains a list of actions that a lender may
undertake in order to police the loan,' 6 ' as
well as permissible "work out"
62
activities undertaken to prevent default.
157. See supra notes 83-121 and accompanying text.
158. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,809 (June 24, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (c)(1)).
159. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985), discussed supra notes 37-54
and accompanying text. Section 300.1 100(c)(1) of the proposed rule provides that:
A security holder is considered to be participating in management if, while the borrower is
still in possession, the security holder is either; (i) exercising decision-making control over
the borrower's environmental compliance, such that the security holder has undertaken
responsibility for the borrower's waste disposal or hazardous substance handling practices
which results in a release or threatened release; or (ii) exercising control at a management
level encompassing the borrower's environmental compliance responsibilities, comparable
to that of a manager of the borrower's enterprise, such that the security holder has assumed or manifested responsibility for the management of the enterprise by establishing,
implementing, or maintaining the policies and procedures encompassing the day-to-day
environmental compliance decision-making of the enterprise.
56 Fed. Reg. 28,809 (June 24, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(1)).
160. Whether the rule should impose an affirmative duty requiring lenders to undertake environmental audits of property suspected of contamination is a hotly debated policy question. See
12 Inside EPA, No. 24, at 3 (June 14, 1991).
161. Under § 300.1100(c)(2)(ii):
Such actions include, but are not limited to, a requirement that the borrower clean up the
vessel or facility prior to or during the term of the security interest; a requirement of
assurance of the borrower's compliance with applicable federal, state, and local environmental and other rules and regulations during the life of the loan or security interest;
securing authority for the holder of the security interest to periodically or regularly monitor or inspect the vessel or facility in which the security holder possesses indicia of ownership (including site inspections) or the borrower's business or financial condition; or other
requirements or conditions reasonably necessary for the security holder to adequately police the loan or security interest, or to comply with legal requirements. Such requirements
may be contained in contractual documents or other relevant documents specifying requirements for financial, environmental, and other warranties, covenants, and representations or promises from the borrower.
56 Fed. Reg. 28,809, (June 24, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(c)(a)(ii)).
162. Section 300.1100(c)(2)(iii) provides, in part: "Work out activities include, but are not
limited to, restructuring or renegotiation of the terms of the loan or other obligation, payment of
additional interest, extension of the payment period, specific or general financial advice, sugges-
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Members of the lending community have applauded the EPA's efforts to
define activities that do not constitute participation in the management of a
facility for purposes of the security interest exemption. However, many believe that the EPA rule will not adequately shield lenders from liability.' 63
Consequently, most continue to urge clarification of the issue through

legislation.
B.

Legislative Proposalsto Amend CERCLA to Limit Lender Liability

In response to concerns raised by lenders, various legislative proposals
protecting lenders from liability under current environmental law have been
introduced in Congress. 1
Initial versions of H.R. 1450, sponsored by
Congressman John LaFalce, would amend CERCLA and RCRA to limit
the liability of fiduciaries, lending institutions, and others. To accomplish
this, the proposal further defined the terms "indicia of ownership," "participating in the management of a vessel or facility," and "primarily to protect
his or her security interest" in language similar to that of the proposed EPA
rule. 6 ' H.R. 1450 also specifically provides that "actions taken by a person
to foreclose, sell, or otherwise cause the transfer of the... facility... shall
not be deemed "participating in the management" of the facility."' 6 6 Senate bill 651, sponsored by Senator Garn, would amend the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act to limit the liability of an insured depository institution
whenever federal law imposes strict liability for the release, or threatened
release, of a hazardous substance to the actual benefit conferred on the institions, counseling, guidance, or other actions reasonably necessary to protect the security interest."
Id. at § 300.1100(c)(2)(iii).
163. There are questions whether the EPA's proposal goes far enough to protect government
agencies like the RTC and FDIC. Supporters of amending the law point out that legislation is
necessary to exempt lenders from liability when they act as fiduciaries or trustees. The EPA rule
does not expressly apply to lender liability under RCRA. See Lawmakers say Legislation Still
Necessary To Shield Innocent Partiesfrom Liability, Env't. Rep. (BNA), No. 22, at 333 (June 14,
1991).
164. As of July 1991, three members of Congress introduced bills designed to restore the
secured creditor exemption. On March 19, Rep. John LaFalce (D-NY) introduced H.R. 1450; on
March 22, Rep. Wayne Owens (D-UT) introduced H.R. 1643; and on March 13, Sen. Jake Garn
(R-UT) introduced S. 651 in the Senate. For a general discussion, see Tupi and Nicholson, supra
note 122, at 161.
165. The bill, sponsored by Rep. John J. LaFalce (D-NY), would expressly exclude persons
who do not participate in the management of the facility as an "owner or operator." H.R. 1450
102d Cong., Ist Sess. 137 CONG. REc. H1774 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1991); 137 CONG. REC. 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. E987 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1991) (extensions of remarks by Rep. John LaFalce) (bill
reprinted).
166. 1991 H.R. 1450 (Mar. 18, 1991)--Version 1. The bill also provides that a lender who
causes or exacerbates a release shall be liable for the cost of such response.
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tution by the response action.1 67 The initial version of the bill also specifically provided that lenders would not be liable under federal law "based
solely on the fact that the institution or lender has the unexercised capacity
16
to influence operations" at or on the property. 1
As may be expected, representatives of the financial community, like the
Mortgage Bankers Association of America and the American Bankers Association, support congressional action on the issue, 169 while many environmental groups oppose changes in the law. 17' The EPA has initially gone on
record as opposing changes in the law, characterizing claims that recent
court decisions have undermined congressional intent to exempt creditors
as "overreactions, '' 17 and arguing that its lender liability regulations will
be sufficient to protect lenders without further amendments to the law. 172
Sponsors of legislative proposals designed to protect lenders from liability for response actions incurred at hazardous waste sites have characterized their bills as "clarifications" of the law, and as a restoration of original
congressional intent."' 3 The proposed EPA rule also maintains that its pur167. 137 CONG. REc. S3191, S3279 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (bill reprinted). The liability
limit would apply to property acquired through foreclosure and would exclude insured depository
institutions or lenders from liability based solely on the unexercised capacity to influence operations at or on the property.
168. 1991 S.651 (Mar. 15, 1991)-Version 1. Under the Garn Bill, the limitation of liability
would not apply to a person that causes or contributes to the release or who, following the acquisition of property through foreclosure, fails to take reasonable steps to prevent the continued release. The bill also contains a provision limiting the liability of governmental entities that acquire
contaminated property, and extends that immunity to the first subsequent purchaser of property
from a Federal banking or lending agency, subject to specified conditions.
169. See Witnesses Tell House Banking PanelLegislation Needed to Clarify CERCLA, Banking Daily (BNA) No. 3, at 94 (July 11, 1991).
170. See Testimony of Andrew Buschbaum, Esq., for the U.S. Public Interest Research
Group Before the Subcommittee on Superfund, Ocean and Water Protection (Apr. 11, 1991).
Buschbaum stated:
the facts establish that there is no liability crisis for lenders under CERCLA .... The
proposals to provide additional special exemptions to lenders purport to solve a problem
that does not exist. Worse, they would undermine and in some cases dismantle the existing
system, with enormous damages to the environment and to taxpayers.
171. EPA Opposes Push to Amend CERCLA to Bolster Protectionfor Lenders, supra note 7, at
1488.
172. Testimony of Raymond B. Ludwiszewski, acting assistant administrator for enforcement
at the EPA before a Senate panel April 11, 1991. Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 2253 (Apr. 19,
1991), stating that agency regulations should, at a minimum, "ensure that innocent federal lending agencies and private holders of security interests are provided the broadest protection reasonably allowable." Id.
173. Senator Garn had some harsh words for the U.S. Court of Appeals' holding in Fleet
Factors stating at a recent hearing before the Senate Banking Committee: "We should not even
need to be here today, except for some damned fool courts that can't read plain English." Daily
Rep. for Exec. (BNA) No. 114, at A-19 (June 13, 1991).
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pose is to clarify the security interest exemption. Clearly, these proposals
from Congress and the EPA involve substantive policy decisions by the legislative and executive branches of government about the proper scope of
lender liability under current environmental law. As such, it is important
to ask whether an administrative or legislative response to that question is
more appropriate in today's climate of deregulation.17 4
IV.

THE EPA PROPOSED RULE ON LENDER LIABILITY: POLICYMAKING THROUGH STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

A.

Chevron and JudicialDeference to Agency Rule-Making

This century has witnessed an enormous increase in the number of federal regulatory agencies. 175 With the adoption of statutes that establish ambitious schemes for resolving substantial and complicated problems, like
that of environmental contamination, Congress has placed a vast amount of
power in the hands of federal agencies.17 6 Challenges to agency decisionmaking frequently include allegations that agency action has exceeded the
agency's legal authority, thus testing the boundaries and limitations of that
power. 177 Challenges to the EPA rule interpreting lender liability under
CERCLA will likely ask the courts to determine whether the agency ex178
ceeded its statutory authority in issuing the interpretive rule.
The question of how much deference courts should give to the agency's
interpretation of its own governing statutes is a legal question that raises
fundamental questions about the appropriate relationship among the
agency, Congress, and the courts in a democratic society. Determining
what the law means has always been considered an essential judicial function. However, when a court interprets imprecise, ambiguous, or conflicting statutory language, it is ultimately making a policy decision. 179 The
174. The term was used to characterize our age by Justice Scalia in a statement made at the
Forty-Fifth Judicial Conference of the D.C. Circuit. Patrice C. Scatena, Note, Deference to Discretion: Scalia'sImpact on JudicialReview of Agency Action in an Era of Deregulation, 38 HAsTINGS L.J 1223, 1223 n.1 (1987).
175. By 1989, the number of federal regulatory agencies had grown to over eighty. See generally Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 465 n.57 (1989).
176. Id.
177. A GUIDE To FEDERAL AGENCY RULE-MAKING, supra note 135, at 335.

178. Id at 335 n.53.
179. Richard J. Pierce, Chevron and its Aftermath: JudicialReview ofAgency Interpretations
of Statutory Provisions,41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 305 (1988); see also Robert A. Anthony, Which
Agency InterpretationsShould Get Judicial Deference?-A Preliminary Inquiry, 40 ADMIN. L.
REV. 121 (1988); Cass Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
407 (1989).
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degree of judicial deference to agency interpretation involves a question of
substantial importance because it is fundamentally concerned with the allocation of power-who should resolve important policy issues left unresolved by the legislative body?
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court in Chevron, US.A., Inc. v.
NaturalResources Defense Council Inc., 8 addressed the degree of deference to be accorded administrative agencies in interpreting statutory language in their governing statutes. The Court upheld EPA regulations that
interpreted the term "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act to permit
states to treat all pollution-emitting devices within an industrial grouping as
within a single "bubble."' 8' In reversing the court of appeals and upholding
the agency's interpretation of the statute, the Court announced a two-pronged test for reviewing agency statutory interpretations. Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, stated:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of
an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible con82
struction of the statute.1

180. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
181. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as

amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401) required states that had not achieved the national air quality standards established by the EPA to establish a permit program regulating "new or modified major
stationary sources" of air pollution. The EPA promulgated regulations to implement the permit
requirement that allowed a state to adopt a plant-wide definition of stationary source. Chevron,
467 U.S. at 840.
182. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. The question presented in the case was whether the EPA's
decision to allow states to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial
grouping as though they were encased within a single "bubble" was based on a reasonable construction of the statutory term "stationary source." The court of appeals had set aside the regulations, stating that the "bubble" concept was "mandatory" in programs designed merely to
maintain existing air quality, but held that it was inappropriate in programs enacted to improve
air quality. Id. at 841. The U.S. Supreme Court, in reversing that judgment, stated: "The basic
legal error of the court of appeals was to adopt a static judicial definition of the term 'stationary
source' when it had decided that Congress itself had not commanded that definition." Id. at 842.
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Under the Chevron test, courts remain the final authority on issues of
statutory construction because they must reject any administrative construction that is contrary to clear congressional intent.18 3 However, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous, the courts must defer to administrative interpretations of the statute." 4 The problem is that statutory language is frequently unclear, and Congress frequently leaves a vast majority of policy
issues, intentionally or unintentionally, for some other governmental institution to resolve.18 5 Consequently, the process of statutory interpretation
86
almost inevitably involves matters of substantial importance.
The Chevron test has been criticized as misconceiving the function of
the judiciary and as threatening the separation of powers.'8 7 The question
of who will control agencies' exercise of that interpretive power is clearly
part of the larger question of who should control administrative policymaking. By deferring to agency decision-making, rather than exercising its
independent judgment, courts increase agency power. Some view the decision to grant an administrative agency the power to interpret law a move
8
that fundamentally alters constitutional ground rules.1
Those defending the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron argue that a
court's "creative statutory interpretation" is not appropriate in administrative law because agencies, not courts, are best equipped to resolve policy
questions under statutes that grant the agency its legal power. 8 9 The
Supreme Court took this position in Chevron, in part, because it believed
that the agency administering the legislation should be able to re-evaluate
the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.190 According to the Supreme
Court, "[j]udges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government[sic]."191 Thus, it was "entirely appropriate"
for the executive branch to make such policy choices and to "resolv[e] the
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not re183. Id at 843 n.9.
184. The Court said: "We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded
to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and
the principle of deference to administrative interpretations ...." Id at 844.
185. Pierce, supra note 179, at 307.
186. Farina, supra note 175, at 466.
187. Id. at 502.
188. Id. at 467.
189. Pierce, supra note 179, at 307; see also Anthony, supra note 179 (noting that Chevron
has been lauded as beneficial because it offers simplicity and convenience to the agency and courts,
and protects agency and administration against undue judicial intrusion). Such interpretations
should be permitted so long as they are not arbitrary or unreasonable.
190. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 836-64.
191. Id. at 865.

MARQUETE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:139

solve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities."' 9 2
In response to concerns that the Court in Chevron conceded too much
authority to administrative agencies, subsequent judicial decisions have emphasized that courts have final authority under the Chevron test to determine issues of statutory construction by retaining the authority to first
determine congressional intent. 9 ' In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,9 4 the
Supreme Court suggested that the applicability of the Chevron test depended upon the kind of question involved. It distinguished questions of
"pure statutory construction for the courts to decide" from those involving
a "question of interpretation that arises in each case in which the agency is
required to apply [a legal standard] to a particular set of facts." '9 5 In the
former case, according to the Supreme Court, courts need not defer to
agency opinions, but may employ traditional tools of interpretation to discover Congressional intent as to the meaning of the statute. 196
Under traditional canons of statutory construction, a court should first
examine the text of a statute in order to ascertain legislative intent."' The
"ordinary meaning" of a word used in the statute is powerful evidence of
congressional intent and, in some cases, of the unreasonableness of an administrative agency's interpretation."'9 The legislative history of an act is
also relevant in determining congressional intent, including, in some cases,
the legislative mood at the time of an acts passage. 199 Other statutory construction techniques may be utilized where appropriate. Statutes should,
for example, be construed to avoid illogical or unreasonable results.2 "°
Congressional action or inaction on the issue may also be relevant in deter192. lI at 865-66.
193. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); International Union, U.A.W. v.
Brock, 816 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
194. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 421.
195. Id at 466; see also Brock, 816 F.2d at 764.
196. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 454. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca asserts that the majority:
badly misinterprets Chevron, and indulged in a "superfluous discussion as the occasion to
express controversial, and I believe erroneous, views on the meaning of... Chevron.
This Court has consistently interpreted Chevron-which has been an extremely important
and frequently cited opinion, not only in this Court but in the Courts of Appeals-as
holding that courts must give effect to a reasonable agency interpretation of a statute unless
that interpretation is inconsistent with a clearly expressed congressional intent.
Id.
197. A court may be bound to assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 449.
198. Brock, 816 F.2d at 765.
199. Id. at 765-66.
200. Id. at 766.
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mining whether Congress in any way "ratified" an agency's interpretation
of the statutory language.2 °1
After utilizing traditional tools of statutory construction, if the court
finds that the agency's interpretation of statutory language is contrary to
clear legislative intent, the court must reject the agency's construction
under the Chevron test.20 2 The degree of deference a court should accord
the agency interpretation of statutory language, therefore, depends upon the
court's initial interpretation of legislative intent.2" 3 The Chevron test grants
the courts substantial discretion in reviewing an agency's interpretation of
statutory language because, in order to determine legislative intent, courts
must first interpret the statutory language, the legislative history, and the
purpose of the statute. The question before the court is not simply what
Congress intended, but what does the court think Congress intended. As a
result, overseeing agency interpretation of statutory language remains an
essential judicial function under the Chevron deference test.
B.

The EPA "'LenderLiability" Rule and the Chevron Test

In order to determine the legislative intent underlying section 9601(20)
(A) of CERCLA (the "security interest" exemption), the courts, applying
traditional techniques of statutory interpretation, should first look to the
statutory language to determine whether that intent is expressed in the
"plain meaning" of the words.
The EPA rule defines "indicia of ownership" in the security interest
exemption as "including full title to real or personal property acquired incident to foreclosure and its equivalents."'2 4 Under this interpretation of "indicia of ownership," a lender may acquire full legal title to the property
through foreclosure and still be entitled to assert the exemption.20 5
Although case law appears to diverge on this question, in at least two cases,
courts have interpreted the security interest exemption as not applying
201. Id. at 767.
202. One writer has identified four reasons why Congress might enact legislation requiring
further interpretation by the agency or the courts: (1) Congress may intend that the implementing
agency will resolve the question; (2) it may recognize that the statute will require interpretation
and assume the courts will resolve the question; (3) it may unwittingly create an interpretive
question by failing to express itself clearly; or (4) it may have no intent at all regarding the question. See Farina, supra note 175, at 468-69.
203. See, e.g., Brock, 816 F.2d at 761.
204. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 56 Fed. Reg.
28,798 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100).
205. Id. at § 300.1 100(b)(1). The rule, however, provides that the lender will lose the exemption if it fails within twelve months following foreclosure to list the property and begin advertising
the property for sale. Id.
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where the lender was record owner of the property.2 "6 In United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust,2 7 the Maryland District Court determined that
the exemption covered only those persons who, at the time of the clean-up,
held indicia of ownership and not full title. The court reached that conclusion in part by examining the language of the exemption. The court believed that the verb tense used in the exemption ("holds" indicia of
ownership) was critical because the language suggested that the security
interest must exist at the time of the clean-up.2 0 8 Because the mortgage (a
security interest) held by the lender terminated at the time of the foreclosure sale, the MarylandBank & Trust court found that the lender's interest
had ripened into full title.20 9
The Guidice v. BFGElectroplatingand Manufacturing Co., Inc.2 1o court
also utilized traditional techniques of statutory interpretation and concluded that the exemption did not apply to record owners of contaminated
property.2 1 1 It reasoned that the purpose of the security exemption was to
protect secured lenders in common-law states where the mortgagee holds
legal title to the mortgaged realty until satisfaction of the underlying loan
obligation. The court stated that the 1986 amendments to CERCLA also
supported a narrow reading of the exemption.2 1 2 According to the court,
because Congress did not amend CERLCA to exclude lenders from liability
who acquired property through foreclosure, but did amend the statute to
protect state and local governments, Congress must have intended to hold
lenders liable as owners.2 13
A court reviewing the EPA's interpretation of this section's statutory
language may also find that the plain meaning of the language and the history of the section indicates that Congress intended to protect secured lenders in common-law states where a mortgagee holds legal title to the
mortgaged realty rather than to provide an exemption for a lender who
takes title to the property through foreclosure. Under that interpretation of
congressional intent, the exemption is inapplicable to institutions purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale, and thus, the EPA's interpretation of

206. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989);

United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). Contra In re
Bergsoe Metal Corporation, 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
207. 632 F.Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986), discussed supra at notes 56-73 and accompanying text.

208. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579.
209. Id.
210. 732 F.Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).

211. The Guidice court relied on the reasoning in Maryland Bank & Trust. Id. at 563.
212. Id.

213. Id.
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"indicia of ownership" in the exemption conflicts with clear legislative
intent.2 14
The EPA's interpretation of this phrase, however, may not be unreasonable or inconsistent with congressional intent under the Ninth Circuit's
21
broader interpretation of the phrase "indicia of ownership" in Bergsoe. 1
In that case, the court found that holding paper title to property is not,
alone, an indicia of ownership for purposes of CERCLA. The important
question, according to the court, is why the owner holds such indicia of
ownership.2 1 6 The Bergsoe court said that the Port of St. Helens, a municipal corporation that had issued revenue bonds to promote industrial development at the site, had received warranty deeds to the site as part of a
transaction whose sole purpose was to provide financing.2 17 The court interpreted the phrase "indicia of ownership" to include taking actual title to
property in circumstances where a financing entity held title primarily to
ensure that the debtor would meet its financial obligations. Under this interpretation, the court found that the Port was not liable as an "owner"
under section 9607(a)(1) or (2) of CERCLA.21 8
The EPA's proposed lender liability rule also defines "participation in
management" in the security interest exemption. The proposed rule limits
the phrase to actualparticipation in management. Thus, the rule rejects the
Eleventh Circuit interpretation of that phrase in Fleet2" 9 and adopts the
Mirabile220 court's interpretation. Did Congress intend to include capacity
or ability to influence facility operations in that phrase? The Fleet court
determined that it did based upon its interpretation of congressional intent
evidenced by the "plain language" of the exemption itself.221 The Fleet
court reasoned that individuals and entities involved in the operations of a
facility are already liable under CERCLA as operators under the express
language of section 9607(a)(2). If Congress intended to absolve secured
creditors from ownership liability, it would have done so. The court reasoned that the phrase "participating in the management" and the term "op214. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984).
215. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990), amended by 937 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
216. Id. at 671.
217. d
218. Id.
219. 901 F.2d 1550 (lth Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
220. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
221. FleetFactors,901 F.2d at 1557. The court stated: "The district court's broad interpretation of the exemption would essentially require a secured creditor to be involved in the operations of a facility in order to incur liability. This construction ignores the plain language of the
exemption and essentially renders it meaningless." Id.
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erator," although similar, are not congruent, and that "participating in the
management" must mean something different. It concluded that "participating in the management" for purposes of the exemption means "participating in the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating222a
'
capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes.
In reviewing the EPA's interpretation of the "security interest" exemption under CERCLA, principles of statutory construction give the courts
substantial discretion in determining the congressional intent underlying
the exemption. Conflicting judicial interpretations of that statute's meaning
suggests that the task of ascertaining congressional intent is not simple, nor
is it a simple application of static principles. Inherent in the question of
whether an agency's interpretation of a statute is permissible is the question
of who should establish policy under the statute and what should that policy
be.
According an agency deference by permitting it to change or "clarify"
prior interpretation of the law may serve the public interest by giving the
agency the flexibility to determine, in light of current administrative goals
and policies, an important issue like the limits of lender liability under
CERCLA.2 23 However, there is little evidence that silence or lack of clarity
in a statute indicates that Congress deliberately intended to delegate the
power to interpret the law to the agency.22 4 Deference to an agency determination of the scope of the security interest exemption essentially concedes
to the agency the interpretive power to determine policy through law-making. Ultimately, the issue of limiting liability under CERCLA for those
who neither caused nor contributed to hazardous waste contamination is an
issue that goes beyond lender liability. It raises fundamental questions
about CERCLA's strict liability scheme and the future course of our national environmental policy. For this reason, Congress, rather than the
administrative agency, should ultimately determine the scope of lender liability under current environmental statutes.
V.

CONCLUSION:

LENDER LIABILITY, STRICT LIABILITY, AND

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

Much of the criticism leveled at the courts' expansive interpretation of
lender liability under CERCLA reflects a dissatisfaction with the Act's gen222. Id.
223. Pierce, supra note 179, at 313. Others have suggested that the prospect that regulatory

statutes will routinely be amended or even repealed by interpretation should at least give us pause.
Farina, supra note 175, at 500.
224. Farina, supra note 175, at 470.
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eral environmental policy. Lenders complain that the law encourages
plaintiffs to sue rich defendants and fosters the view that lenders are "deeppocket" targets for liability.22 5 Banks complain they may be liable even
though they may have done everything they could have to protect themselves.2 26 The general debate about whether Congress should protect lenders from Superfund liability raises questions about CERCLA's entire strictliability scheme.22 7
CERCLA was designed to clean up sites contaminated by hazardous
wastes-it was not designed to be fair.22 8 Today, however, the entire legislative scheme established by CERCLA is coming under increasing attack
precisely because of concerns that it does not fairly apportion the massive
costs of cleaning up the nation's hazardous waste sites. 229 Recently, powerful interest groups have squared-off against CERCLA's strict liability
scheme. 230 Large industries have begun a campaign to "spread the CERCLA pain" by filing third-party Superfund lawsuits against smaller businesses and other waste-makers, seeking help in bearing the costs of cleaning
contaminated sites. 23 1 As liability under CERCLA reaches beyond major
industries to small businesses, municipal governments, and perhaps even
individual citizens, efforts to "reform" the law to protect those entities are
23 2
likely to increase.
It is probably true that potential liability under Superfund gives lenders
an incentive to act as "environmental police" by encouraging lenders to
develop an environmental risk policy and to determine, at the time property
changes hands, that sound environmental practices are in place. 233 It is also
true that after Fleet, some lenders will be more wary in granting loans to
225. United States Banker, May, 1990, at 8.

226. Id.
227. See Leifer & Musiker, Cleaning up Superfund: 10 Changesto Make DuringReauthorization, Env. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 915 n.19 (Sept. 14, 1990) (citing, among other things, the issue

of the passive intervening landowner liability: "It is unclear under CERCLA whether the intervening landowner, who did not contribute to the hazardous substance release, is liable for response costs."). Id
228. I.dat 59.
229. See Marianne LaVelle, Setting Sights on Superfund, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 18, 1991, vol. 13,
no. 24, at 1.
230. Id
231. Id. at 36.
232. Arguments over who is responsible for a waste site containing household trash are likely
to increase concerns about CERCLA's liability scheme. As an industry spokesman pointed out:
"If you drop a copper penny into a wastebasket, you're a PRP." Id
233. Id. at 39. Phase I audits (consisting of a site visit and review of the history of site
activities) are commonly conducted for loan transactions. After FleetFactors,the scope of such
audits will probably increase. Holland, The Evolving Issue of Lender Liability, ENV. NEWs REP.,
Fall, 1990, at 3.
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businesses if contamination at the site is discovered during the audit process. 234 Congress must balance these concerns in determining the proper
scope of lender liability under CERCLA. Determining the proper scope of
lender liability is inextricably entwined with broader economic and environmental policy decisions. Exempting one segment of the business community from clean-up costs under CERCLA means that someone else will
have to pay those costs. In some cases, entities with only peripheral involvement in the cause of contamination may be liable.
In determining whether to limit the liability of lenders and other financial institutions under CERCLA, Congress must not only consider the concerns of lenders, it should consider the question of lender liability in the
larger context of re-examining the policies underlying the creation of the
Superfund program. Superfund is the biggest and most costly environmental program in the nation.2 35 Some maintain that the strict, joint and several liability provisions of CERCLA have serious economic impact by
encouraging litigation that results in huge transaction costs and ultimately
delays clean-up of contaminated sites.236 By encouraging litigation, the law
may ultimately discourage clean-up of contaminated sites by delaying response actions and by diverting resources from prevention and clean-up to
liability management.2 37
The issue of lender liability is part of the larger question of how to apportion the environmental clean-up costs of hazardous waste sites. Ultimately, Congress must reauthorize Superfund in a manner consistent with
the larger policy issues involved. It would be most appropriate that Congress, when reauthorizing Superfund, consider the scope of lender liability
under CERCLA because this issue is inextricably bound to the policy questions of application of strict liability principles in the environmental law
context.2 38 The courts may find that the EPA's proposed rule is a permissible interpretation of ambiguous statutory language contained in the law.
Ultimately, however, it is the responsibility of the legislative body to clarify
the scope of lender liability under CERCLA. In the final analysis, Con-

234. Id.
235. LaVelle, supra note 229, at 1.
236. The American International Group, lobbyist for the insurance industry, says as much as
60 percent of Superfund cleanup funds go toward legal expenses "in costly efforts to fix the blame
instead of the problem." Id. at 37.
237. Environmental concerns also increase the paper-work involved in conveying, leasing,
and financing documents. Roger D. Schwenke, Environmental Liabilities Imposed on Landowners, Tenants, and Lenders-How FarCan and Should They Extend? 18 Envtl. L. Rep., (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,361 (Sept. 1988).
238. In the final hours of Congress in October, 1990, Congress extended CERCLA for another four years without making any major changes in it. LaVelle, supra note 229, at I.

1991]

LIMITING LENDER LIABILITY

177

gress, not the administrative agency or the courts, should establish the limits of lender liability for cleaning up contaminated sites under Superfund.
Congress should establish these limits through a re-examination of the environmental policy under the Act.

